Efficient Hybrid Security Mechanisms for Heterogeneous Sensor Networks

Patrick Traynor, Student Member, IEEE, Raju Kumar, Heesook Choi, Student Member, IEEE, Guohong Cao, Senior Member, IEEE, Sencun Zhu, and Thomas La Porta, Fellow, IEEE

Abstract—Many applications that make use of sensor networks require secure communication. Because asymmetric-key solutions are difficult to implement in such a resource-constrained environment, symmetric-key methods coupled with a priori key distribution schemes have been proposed to achieve the goals of data secrecy and integrity. These approaches typically assume that all nodes are similar in terms of capabilities and, hence, deploy the same number of keys in all sensors in a network to provide the aforementioned protections. In this paper, we demonstrate that a probabilistic unbalanced distribution of keys throughout the network that leverages the existence of a small percentage of more capable sensor nodes can not only provide an equal level of security, but also reduce the consequences of node compromise. To fully characterize the effects of the unbalanced key management system, we design, implement, and measure the performance of a complementary suite of key establishment protocols known as LIGER. Using their predeployed keys, nodes operating in isolation from external networks can securely and efficiently establish keys with each other. Should resources such as a backhaul link to a key distribution center (KDC) become available, networks implementing LIGER automatically incorporate and benefit from such facilities. Detailed experiments demonstrate that the unbalanced distribution in combination with the multimodal LIGER suite offers a robust and practical solution to the security needs in sensor networks.

Index Terms—Heterogeneous sensor networks, probabilistic key management, probabilistic authentication, hybrid network security.

1 INTRODUCTION

The deployment of wireless sensor networks is becoming more common in a wide range of environments. In scenarios ranging from the remote observation of wildlife and the monitoring of so-called “smart” buildings to commercial inventory management and vehicle/target tracking, sensor networks are being employed for the task of distributed information accumulation. These systems have traditionally been composed of a large number (hundreds to a few thousand [1]) of homogeneous nodes with extreme resource constraints. This combination of austere capabilities and physical exposure make security in sensor networks an extremely difficult problem.

Because traditional asymmetric encryption is not practical in this environment, a number of clever symmetric-key management schemes have been introduced. One well-received solution that has been extended by several researchers is to distribute a certain number of randomly selected keys in each of the nodes throughout the network [9], [4], [7], [16], [37]. Using this approach, one can achieve a known probability of connectivity within a network. These previous efforts have assumed a deployment of homogeneous nodes and have therefore suggested a balanced distribution of random keys to each of the nodes to achieve security. Likewise, the analysis of those solutions relies on assumptions specific to a homogeneous environment.

A deviation from the homogeneous system model has been increasingly discussed in the research community. Instead of assuming that sensor networks are comprised entirely of low-ability nodes, a number of authors have started exploring the idea of deploying a heterogeneous mix of platforms and harnessing the available “microservers” for a variety of needs. For example, Mhatre et al. [20] automatically designate nodes with greater inherent capabilities and energy as cluster heads in order to maximize network lifetime. Traynor et al. [32] extend this idea to mobile groups by having a more powerful node perform group handoffs for neighboring sensors.

Heterogeneity also offers new possibilities in terms of network connectivity. The currently available schemes for connectivity in homogeneously composed sensor networks assume one of two scenarios: either a network with access to a key distribution center (KDC) via a base station or a remotely located, stand-alone system without access to any infrastructure. We argue, however, that the expansion of heterogeneous networks allows for systems to potentially operate in a multimodal fashion. For example, consider an air-deployed sensor network being dispersed over a disputed border area. Nodes arrive long before friendly forces are likely to be moving through the region and must therefore begin the process of secure data collection without help from external mechanisms. If nodes are equipped with symmetric keys through an a priori distribution scheme, neighbors will be able to exchange encrypted transmissions; however, it is extremely difficult for nodes to truly, scalably authenticate each other. If, at a later time, the arrival of allied troops provides access to a backbone network, a truly robust system should be able to harness the additional security guarantees such as centralized authority and scalable authentication provided by a KDC.
In this paper, we leverage heterogeneity to provide more robust key management and establishment protocols for sensor networks. First, we introduce the probabilistic unbalanced key management scheme. Unlike previous homogeneous key distribution schemes, the number of keys stored by each node in the network is proportional to its inherent resources. We then derive probabilities for connectivity under a number of new key establishment trust models. Third, we design and implement a suite of protocols which we call LIGER. Networks running the LIGER suite can not only establish keys between nodes in the absence of a backhaul connection, but also take advantage of such resources when they become available. This is the first multimodal key establishment suggested for sensor networks. Last, we characterize this hybrid protocol through an extensive performance analysis and examination of the savings gained from code reuse. In so doing, we demonstrate that the use of heterogeneity through the unbalanced key distribution and LIGER suite provides robust, efficient, and practical mechanisms to support the secure operation of sensor networks.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 examines pertinent related work. Section 3 details our new network model and explores the theoretical connectivity of such systems under a variety of key establishment trust models. Section 4 presents the specifics of LIGER, our hybrid key establishment protocol. Section 5 provides a detailed analysis of the performance and overhead of our scheme compared to traditional balanced approaches. Section 6 offers additional observations and discussion about the advantages and trade-offs of such a scheme. Section 7 provides concluding remarks and discusses future work.

2 RELATED WORK

The preceding work in the field of key management for wireless sensor networks can be broken into two categories: schemes that have constant access to a KDC or trusted third-party keying mechanism and those that never do. While there has also been a large body of work on distributed certificate authorities applied to ad hoc networks, these schemes rely on public key cryptography. Emerging work in elliptic curve cryptography [15], [18] may one day allow such schemes to be deployed; however, symmetric key-based schemes are currently the most practical option.

The wired world of networking is already familiar with a number of protocols for authentication and session key establishment. The classic protocol for authenticating communications between two machines was written by Needham and Schroeder [22]. Improvements to this protocol were made in the abundantly used Kerberos [13]. Fox and Gribble proposed the use of Charon [10], a proxy server designed to offload the memory overhead of Kerberos for mobile devices. However, as these protocols require a large number of transmissions in order to establish a single session key with neighbors, they are therefore not particularly well suited for this environment.

A more appropriate centralized keying method for sensor networks is proposed in the SPINS protocol [25], which makes use of a modified version of the TESLA [24] authentication protocol (μTesla). Each node in a network running SPINS contains only a pair-wise key with the base station/KDC and uses one-way hash chains for creating an epoch-delayed key release mechanism for use in authenticated broadcast. If two nodes A and B wish to establish keys with each other, A sends a request to B, which creates and forwards a token to the base station. The base station generates a session key, encrypts it in the secret keys that it shares with each of the involved parties, and transmits the data. While this scheme has many attractive attributes, it will not operate if the base station/KDC is unreachable.

A large number of key distribution schemes have been proposed for networks that are unable to access a KDC after deployment. The most famous of these predistribution schemes is the work by Eschenauer and Gligor [9]. Given a key pool of size \( P \), nodes are preloaded with \( k \) keys (selected without replacement) such that two randomly picked nodes can communicate with a given probability (i.e., share at least one key). In order to determine whether or not a key is shared, each node broadcasts its key identifiers (which are randomly associated with the keys themselves before deployment) in plaintext. Neighbors sharing a key associated with one of those identifiers then issue a challenge/response to the source. If two nodes do not share keys directly, they can establish a session key with the help of neighbors with which a key is already shared. While this technique is well suited for establishing session keys in a stand-alone network, it does not provide support for authentication.

This work was expanded via a number of methods by Chan et al. [4]. One extension requires nodes to share at least \( q \) keys to establish secure communication links. This greatly reduces the possibility of an intruder being able to eavesdrop on communications through the compromise of a small number of peer nodes. Additionally, the authors suggest a distribution model in which each node stores pairwise keys between some subset of the nodes in the network. This allows nodes to authenticate peers with which they share one of the pairwise keys and limits the damage done to uncompromised nodes when keys are exposed to an adversary.

Other authors propose different mechanisms for storing or generating keys to reduce memory requirements. In [36], the authors propose an erasure-based predeployment method to create secure channels over which group keys are distributed. A number of other researchers have proposed incorporating location-based information into the assignment of keys [8], [16], [17]. Because of the expensive and high power-drain characteristics of GPS units, these schemes typically rely upon initial node placement for this information. The use of polynomials [7], [6] and channel diversity [21] for establishing keys have also been investigated.

None of the previous work has fully defined a protocol or directly measured the performance of an implementation of the security methods they propose. The implementation and measurements presented here show the viability of these systems in a practical environment and illustrate their sensitivity to MAC layer collisions and network density.
Fig. 1. New models for connectivity available in heterogeneous sensor networks. Sensors can communicate with their peers or act as neighborhoods in a larger ad hoc network. Secondary radios (e.g., 802.11) on L2 nodes offer access to external resources.

3 NETWORK MODEL

This section begins by exploring a new network model made possible by heterogeneity. We then introduce the notion of the unbalanced key distribution and a series of trust models for key establishment. The goal of these protocols is to create secure links between neighboring nodes, thereby providing secure hop-by-hop communications across the network. In so doing, this solution for key distribution allows systems to operate securely while minimizing the burden placed upon the least capable nodes in the system.

3.1 Heterogeneous Sensor Networks

The previous work on random key predeployment in sensor networks has assumed either a grid or very large random-graph arrangement such that all neighbors within the transmission radius of a given node are reachable. Communication between adjacent nodes is therefore limited only by key matching. This model is not always realistic for a number of reasons. Primarily, it fails to take into account that signal-blocking barriers including hills, buildings, and walls may exist between neighboring nodes. More importantly, it fails to consider that better radio technology and resources are available to some members of the network. Because the assumptions of topology and topography used in most previous approaches are violated in realistic settings, we propose a new network model.

Fig. 1 shows a network model with two main differences from that used in previous work. First, the landscape over which a sensor network is placed contains features that may segregate nodes into exclusive neighborhoods. Because nodes are still distributed through the same methods discussed in previous papers (e.g., dropped from an airplane), there is no way to determine a node’s neighbors a priori. Due to the random nature of the deployment, the potential for node mobility and addition of nodes at a later time, assigning keys for specific neighbors is not possible. Second, instead of a homogeneous composition of nodes, the network now consists of a mix of nodes with different capabilities and missions. The sensing or Level 1 (L1) nodes are assumed to be very limited in terms of memory and processing capability and perform the task of data collection. These nodes are indicated as white circles in Fig. 1. Level 2 (L2) nodes have more memory, processing ability, and additional radios (e.g., 802.11). These nodes are equipped with additional keys and take on the role of routers and gateways between networks. In addition to tamper-resistant casings [12], L2 nodes are assumed to be equipped with a fast encryption/deletion algorithm to protect their supplementary keys from compromise if they are captured. We discuss the relaxation of this assumption and examine the effects of L2 compromise in Section 6.

Such a model presents a number of new possibilities for sensor networks. First, many of the techniques that have proven successful in ad hoc networks (e.g., secure routing [3, 11, 23, 26]) can now be incorporated into sensor networks. Second, with at least intermittent connectivity to external networks, resources previously unavailable to sensor networks can now assist in their operation.

3.2 Unbalanced Key Distribution

Our scheme for the unbalanced distribution of keys throughout a wireless sensor network builds upon the previously described balanced approach of Eschenauer and Gligor [9]. Under the balanced approach, a large pool of $P$ keys is generated, from which $k$ are randomly selected, without replacement, for each sensor node. Two nodes may communicate to directly establish a session key if they have a key match. The probability that two nodes with the same number of random keys, $k$, share at least one key is [9]

$$P_{Match} = 1 - \frac{(P-k)!^2}{P!(P-2k)!}. \quad (1)$$

If nodes do not have a key match, they may still establish a session key through one or more intermediate nodes with which they each have a common key.

Given the same generated key pool of size $P$, we store a key ring of size $k$ keys in each sensor (L1) node and a key ring of size $m$ keys in each L2 node, where $m \gg k$. The equation for the probability of an L2 and L1 having at least one key in common is given by (2):

$$P_{Match} = 1 - \frac{(P-k)!(P-m)!}{P!(P-m-k)!}. \quad (2)$$

The derivations of all equations are available in [30]. Using (2), the sizes of $k$ and $m$ can be varied according to the needs and constraints of the system designer. After key predeployment, nodes in the network discover the keys shared with their neighbors in the shared-key discovery phase.

The session-key establishment phase attempts to create a secure communication link for pairs of nodes within a wireless transmission range that lack a shared key from the previous phase. If it is possible to communicate between a pair of nodes by using a multihop path through secure and trusted neighbors, then a key can be generated at the shared neighbor and distributed to the two endpoints. At the
completion of this final phase, all nodes within transmission radius of each other should be able to communicate directly to whatever reliability the network designers have specified. Section 4 offers significantly greater details on these two phases.

This basic scheme was extended by Chan et al. [4] by requiring nodes to share at least \( q \) keys with each other. In so doing, it becomes more difficult for an attacker to compromise communications as \( q \) instead of one key must first be captured. While providing robustness to compromise, the \( q \)-composite scheme has not previously been considered for the purpose of node authentication. Specifically, if a node can prove its possession of multiple keys known to be assigned to it, its identity can be probabilistically authenticated. Under the balanced scheme, an increase in \( q \) requires a significant growth in the number of keys stored by all L1 nodes. However, the unbalanced approach can reduce the burden of the \( q \)-composite scheme on L1 nodes while retaining its security advantages.

The probability that two nodes containing key rings of differing sizes share exactly \( i \) keys is

\[
p(i) = \frac{\binom{P}{i} \binom{P-i}{m-i} \binom{m-i+(k-i)}{m-i}}{\binom{P}{m} \binom{k}{i}}.
\]

(3)

The probability that two nodes share at least \( q \) keys with each other is therefore

\[
1 - \sum_{i=0}^{q-1} p(i).
\]

(4)

We discuss the use of probabilistic authentication in Section 4.

3.3 Key Establishment Trust Models

One of the overarching themes of the previous work in this area is trust between nodes sharing a common key. Whether due to suspicion of compromise, lack of a shared neighbor, or resource constraints, such a model of connectivity may not be realistic. We therefore explore three trust models of key establishment for which we derive connectivity equations. Note that we assume that communication between L1 and L2 nodes occurs using radios of equal capability so as to provide a fair comparison between the homogeneous and heterogeneous schemes.

3.3.1 Backhaul Trust

In this model, the information collected by L1 nodes is to be backhauled to a resource outside of the local network. In a battlefield setting, this may correspond to a nearby unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), which relies upon deployed sensors for targeting data. Accordingly, there is no need for an L1 to trust any node but its neighboring L2 node with access to a backhaul link. A key match must therefore exist between the two. In cases of a single L2 node being present in a neighborhood, we simply apply (2). If more than one L2 node is present in a neighborhood, two cases exist. In the first, all of the L2 nodes may act as gateways. In the second, only one L2 node will serve as a gateway to the backbone network. In this case, an L1 node may have a key match with the L2 gateway node or, because L2 nodes are trusted, may establish a session key through a path of one or more of the other L2 nodes.

Because the number of keys in the L2 nodes is very high, both theory and practice demonstrate that L2 nodes are able to communicate with each other with a far greater probability than 5-9s reliability; therefore, secure links between L2s will always be assumed. In either case, the probability that any L1 node can communicate with the gateway is

\[
P[Conn] = 1 - (1 - U)^g,
\]

(5)

where \( U \) is defined by (2) and \( g \) is the number of neighboring L2 nodes. Fig. 2 shows the number of keys that must be stored in each L2 node for \( k = 10, 20, \) and 30. Fig. 3 shows the results of experiments validating these calculated values. All cases were run an order of magnitude more times than the minimum requirement to determine connectivity (10,000 times for 3-9s, etc.).

3.3.2 Peer to Peer Limited Trust

An L1 node desires to communicate with another L1 node in its neighborhood but only trusts the destination itself or a trusted neighbor to establish keys. To do this, it either requires a direct key match with the peer L1 node or it must be able to establish a session key through a path of one or more L2 nodes. Because L2 nodes are assumed to be more
secure due to the presence of key-protecting algorithms, all L2 nodes can be used. The probability of connectivity, where $B$ is defined in (1), is therefore:

$$P[\text{Conn}] = 1 - (1 - B)(1 - (1 - U)^g)^2.$$  \hspace{1cm} (6)

### 3.3.3 Peer to Peer Liberal Trust

Previous studies have only considered the use of up to $n - 1$ neighbors for the establishment of a session-key. Allowing such a possibly long path to establish session keys has the following two drawbacks: First, the potential latency caused by allowing up to $n - 1$ hops for initializing secure communication may be unacceptably high for the network to complete its mission, especially in cases of high mobility in which nodes may be required to establish new session keys often in the middle of active communication [29]. Second, the introduction of multiple hops may increase the chance that compromised but undetected intermediaries are able to eavesdrop on the actual session-key establishment. While not in the direct path of future packet exchanges, compromised adjacent nodes that assisted with keying may still be able to overhear and decrypt the communications of uncompromised neighbors. Because each hop along an indirect keying path is able to decrypt the data from the previous hop, the probability that at least one compromised node is in a path increases as that path becomes longer. Limiting the number of hops to one in the liberal case may be adequate protection against such problems.

To estimate the connectivity when limiting the number of hops through which a key may be established to one, we determine the expected number of nodes that any L1 node can communicate with either directly or through one hop. For networks with balanced key distributions, this value is given by (7):

$$E_{L1}^1 = B \cdot (n - 1) + \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} \binom{n-1}{i} B^i (1 - B)^{n-1-i} E_1,$$  \hspace{1cm} (7)

where $E_1 = (n - 1 - i)(1 - (1 - B))^i$. For networks with unbalanced key distributions, the value is given by (8):

$$E_{L1}^1 = E_0 + \sum_{k=1}^{g} \binom{g}{k} U^k (1 - U)^{g-k} (1 - B)^{n-1} E_1$$

$$+ \sum_{k=1}^{g} \binom{g}{k} \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} \binom{n-1}{i} U^i (1 - U)^{g-k} B^i (1 - B)^{n-1-i} E_2$$

$$+ \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} \binom{n-1}{i} B^i (1 - B)^{n-1-i} (1 - U)^g E_3.$$  \hspace{1cm} (8)

where

$$E_0 = B \cdot (n - 1),$$

$$E_1 = (n - 1)(1 - (1 - U)^k),$$

$$E_2 = [(n - 1 - i)(1 - (1 - U)^k)]$$

$$+ [(n - 1 - i)(1 - U)^k(1 - (1 - B))^i],$$

$$E_3 = (n - 1 - i)(1 - (1 - B))^i.$$  

The derivations of (7) and (8) are given in [30].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Unbalanced</th>
<th>Balanced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L2 Keys</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L1 Keys</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Backhaul</td>
<td>689</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2P Limited</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2P Liberal, 1-hop</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2P Liberal, n-hop</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>q-Composite Backhaul</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given $E_{L1}$, the expected connectivity of the neighborhood is calculated by (9):

$$P[\text{Conn}] = \frac{E_{L1}^1}{n + g - 1}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (9)

The memory savings for 5-9s connectivity afforded by the unbalanced approach are summarized in Table 1.

### 4 Protocol Specification

The specifications for our protocols are now described in detail. For simplicity, the protocol for a network in an infrastructureless environment will be referred to as LION. The scheme relying upon the presence of the KDC will be referred to as TIGER. LIGER covers the integration of these two components.

The highlights of the protocol operation follow: All nodes are loaded with a random set of keys drawn from a common pool before being deployed. In addition, the mapping of keys to nodes is stored in a KDC. If the network is operating in stand-alone mode, i.e., with no KDC, we define a protocol to instantiate probabilistic keying. If the network has access to a KDC, we leverage the knowledge of the predeployed keys to perform probabilistic authentication with a high degree of confidence. In addition, session keys are established with the enforcement of least privilege. Nodes gather information in this mode of operation so that they may continue to perform some level of probabilistic authentication if the KDC becomes unavailable for periods of time. The mode of operation may change between stand-alone and KDC-mode.

The portrait of sensor networks painted by most of the current literature is one of extremes. Systems exist either in total separation from infrastructure and intervention or with constant access to such resources. Networks designed to operate in isolation therefore never consider harnessing new resources as they become available. Likewise, systems designed with a reliance upon available infrastructure flounder in its absence. In reality, large-scale sensor networks will have to optimally perform their missions in both of the above settings. If, for example, there is a method of transmitting data from a sink node to some external destination, then the ability of a sensor node to communicate with a KDC is entirely realistic. Indeed, if data cannot be drawn out of a sensor network and delivered to some distant location, the usefulness of the network is extremely limited.

Simply placing either only LION, TIGER, or any other single-mode scheme in a sensor node therefore fails to fully
utilize the potential of these networks. The answer, however, is not using combined, unaltered versions of both LION and TIGER in each sensor. Such a solution fails to take advantage of redundant or similar mechanisms. Specifically, including a unique master key for the purpose of authentication via a KDC fails to take into account the potential size of the code supporting this additional protocol. Because the highly constrained memory of L1 nodes is one of the chief concerns of all solutions implemented on these platforms and an equally effective solution can be achieved probabilistically, a hybrid method of key management becomes the most efficient solution for such a setting.

The combination of slightly modified versions of these two schemes results in LIGER—a more robust method of key management for heterogeneous sensor networks. The combination enables different levels of probabilistic authentication without increasing memory requirements of the L1 sensor nodes.

We first describe the stand-alone component of the system (LION), followed by the KDC-based component of the system (TIGER). We then describe probabilistic authentication and its application to LIGER.

**Notation.**

- $A, B$ are principles (e.g., communicating L1 nodes).
- $ID_{A_1}, \cdots, ID_{A_{k-1}}$ are the sorted key identifiers corresponding to the keys held by node $A$.
- $K_A$ is a secret key known by node $A$.
- $K_{A,B}$ is a session key shared between nodes $A$ and $B$.
- $K_{A,auth}$ is an authenticator key for node $A$.
- $K_L$ is some key corresponding to an ID from within the range described directly above.
- $L_1$ is a sensor node.
- $L_2(GW)$ is the L2/Gateway node.
- $MAC(K_A, R(S))$ is a Message Authentication Code of the values $R$ and $S$, using key $K_A$.
- $MAP_A$ is the bitmap corresponding to a sorted representation of $ID_{A_1}, \cdots, ID_{A_{k-1}}$.
- $N$ is a nonce.
- $\{S\}_K$ is a value $S$ encrypted in key $K$.

### 4.1 LION: Standalone Key Management

After deployment under the LION protocol, an L1 node learns its neighbors through the exchange of Hello messages and then attempts to establish keys with them. To accomplish this, the node broadcasts all of its key identifiers. Because the keys themselves are not transmitted and similar information could be gathered from a traffic analysis attack [9], this method does not compromise the integrity of the node itself. If a neighboring node overhears this transmission and determines that it shares one of the keys associated with the broadcast, it responds to the source with a challenge/response. Other methods of determining the keys of neighbors include the use of hash functions [37], encrypted broadcasts [9], [4], and the use of polynomials [2].

Messages 1 and 2 in Fig. 4 show the message flow for the case in which a node, $A$, has a key match, $K_A$, with an L2 node. The messages exchanged between the two exhibit the following format:

1. $A \rightarrow * : A, N, ID_{A_1}, \cdots, ID_{A_{k-1}}$.
2. $L_2 \rightarrow A : A, L_2, N, ID_A, \{ID_{A_1}, L_2, N\}_{K_A}$.

L1 nodes amass a list of neighbors with which they do and do not share keys. When the shared-key discovery phase ends, a node attempts to use the neighbors with which keys are already shared to assist it in establishing secure connections with all neighbors. In the Limited Trust model discussed here, this “Request for Assistance” (which contains all of the node IDs with which a secure relationship has not been established) is sent directly to an L2 node. The L2 node, having already established a link with the targeted L1, transmits a message to the requester and targeted node containing a session key encrypted in each of the keys shared with the L2 node. Each L1 node then receives the L2 broadcast, decrypts the session key, and begins the secure transmission of data. The messages for the indirect phase are:

3. $A \rightarrow L_2 : A, B, N$.

Messages 3 and 4 in Fig. 4 show the indirect phase of the protocol with the “Request for Assistance” message transmitted to the neighboring L2 node following the Limited Trust model. This message would be broadcast to all neighbors if a less stringent trust model was in effect.

If a node assists in establishing a session key during the indirect phase of the protocol, it deletes this key as soon as end-to-end communication is established. The two endpoints of communication also re-key immediately. If a node is compromised at a later time, it will not contain any valid session keys other than its own. A more detailed discussion of compromise is given in Section 6.

### 4.2 TIGER: KDC-Based Key Management

In locations such as “smart buildings” or factories where sensor networks may be used to gather data corresponding to changing environmental, structural, and inventory-related conditions, access to a KDC is an entirely realistic assumption. We have designed TIGER for this scenario. Because this protocol is similar to most KDC-based systems, we provide only a brief description here.
Before the system is initialized, each L1 node is bootstrapped with the same set of $k$ keys as with LION. L2 nodes share a public/private key combination with the KDC.

To perform authentication, each node creates an authenticator key from a combination of their predeployed keys as described below. After discussing the basic authentication mechanism, we give a detailed definition of this protocol.

### 4.2.1 Probabilistic Authentication

One of the chief goals in the development of sensor network security is the minimization of memory overhead. Specifically, if the ability of an L1 node to perform its sensing task is limited by the memory footprint of a security solution, the security solution should be considered ineffective. Because one of the primary occupiers of memory in random predistribution schemes is the keys themselves, all efforts must be made to decrease this burden on the platform. Accordingly, LIGER only stores a single set of keys for use in both the LION and TIGER portions of operation. To provide robust operation in the face of disconnection with the KDC, these keys are predeployed as in the LION method.

In order to prove its authenticity, a node instantiates a temporary authenticator key by which the system may perform probabilistic authentication. This key is created using a simple operation on a subset of the $k$ predeployed keys in each L1 node. This scheme is also used for L1 nodes to loosely authenticate each other via an L2 node when a KDC is unavailable.

In TIGER, each L1 node uses $q$ of its $k$ predeployed keys to generate the authenticator key. The key itself is created by performing an XOR on the selected $q$ keys. This operation is guaranteed to create an unguessable, pseudo-random value from the key space as demonstrated by Shannon [27]. Because an attacker must know all of the key values associated with the creation of an authenticator key in order to derive it, this system is protected to a threshold of $q-1$ for any given node. The hardness of breaking an authenticator key, for some $q<k$, is further enhanced as discussed in the protocol definition by allowing the subset of keys from which the authenticator key is derived to be changed as described below in the protocol specification. An analysis of the robustness of the authenticator key is given in [31]. Because the KDC knows all $k$ keys pre-deployed in each sensor node, it can compute authenticator keys and, thus, authenticate each L1 node in the network.

One drawback of the original $q$-composite method is that it requires an increase in the number of keys deployed in an L1 node to provide a reasonable probability of obtaining $q$ key matches. When using a KDC in our system, no additional keys are required in the L1 nodes to maintain the likelihood of $q$ key matches between an L1 node and a KDC because the KDC knows all of the keys deployed in the L1 nodes. In addition, because, with unbalanced key distribution, only a small number of keys are deployed in L1 nodes, the likelihood of one L1 node having $q$ keys in common with a second L1 node and, thus, being able to impersonate it is infinitesimally small.

### 4.2.2 TIGER Protocol Definition

TIGER takes advantage of a KDC with a protocol enforcing least privilege over key establishments while retaining the ability to operate should the connection to infrastructure cease to exist. We discuss the case in which nodes are activated and a link to the KDC is available through an L2 node. If conditions prevent a connection being established, as is the case in the military deployment example, the network defaults to the LION protocol until a KDC link becomes available.

#### L1-L1 Authentication and Key Establishment

An L1 node $A$ wishing to establish a secure and authenticated session key with a neighboring L1, a node advertising itself as $B$, begins the process by creating a token. The token itself is the MAC of a series of values included in the initial packet—the principles involved in the exchange, a nonce, and a sorted bitmap of the keys used to create the current authenticator key. Upon receiving the token, the node believed by $A$ to be $B$ makes a decision as to whether or not it desires an authenticated connection with the node it believes to be $A$. For example, if $B$ has low battery power, it may not wish to establish a key with $A$ and, thus, drops the request.

If $B$ decides to set up an authenticated relationship with $A$, it includes the token sent by $A$ with its own token in a message to an L2 node. The L2 node then forwards the packet on to the KDC. The validity of the two tokens is determined by generating the appropriate authenticator keys for both $A$ and $B$ according to the sorted bitmaps of the identifiers corresponding to keys used to make each token. If both tokens are deemed legitimate, the KDC responds with a message to the L2 containing a copy of a session key encrypted in a new, randomly chosen authenticator key for both $A$ and $B$. The message from the KDC will also contain a bitmap corresponding to each of the authenticator keys used to sign the session keys. Nodes $A$ and $B$ then receive a transmission from the L2 node, generate the appropriate authenticator keys to unlock the session key, and begin communication. The messages for this protocol flow as shown in Fig. 5 and appear as follows.

1. $A \rightarrow B : A, B, N, MAP_A, MAC(K_{A, AUTH}, A|B|N|MAP_A)$.
2. $B \rightarrow L2 : A, B, N, MAP_B, MAC(K_{B, AUTH}, A|B|N|MAP_B), MAP_A, MAC(K_{A, AUTH}, A|B|N|MAP_A)$.
3. $L2 \rightarrow KDC :$ Forward Message 2 to KDC.
4. $KDC \rightarrow L2 : A, B, N, MAP_A, (K_{A, B, N})_{(K_{A, B, w})}$, $MAP_B, (K_{A, B, N})_{(K_{B, w})}$, $MAC(K_{A, B, A}|B|N|K_{A, B}|MAP_A|MAP_B)$.
5. $L2 \rightarrow A : A, B, N, MAP_A, (K_{A, B, N})_{(K_{A, B, w})}$, $MAC(K_{A, B, A}|B|N|K_{A, B}|MAP_A)$.
6. $L2 \rightarrow B : A, B, N, MAP_B, (K_{A, B, N})_{(K_{B, w})}$, $MAC(K_{A, B, A}|B|N|K_{A, B}|MAP_B)$.

Requiring the KDC to create a new authenticator key allows the protocol to supplementary harden the system against an attacker compromising multiple nodes in an attempt to forge an identity. For example, a valid authenticator key could be generated by the KDC from any of the elements available in the compliment of the
bitmap of the original message. Furthermore, it allows for key revocation protocols to exclude the use of keys specifically known to be compromised. Such a policy would not need to be enacted for the generation of authenticated session keys until all keys associated with the authenticator key are compromised. This will extend the lifetime of a network.

This scheme is similar to Kerberos in that it requires a ticket from a node by which it may be authenticated before a session key is granted. In TIGER, however, both nodes in which a session key is being established are required to provide a token to the KDC. We feel this protocol is more suited to a peer-to-peer environment and prevents a single node from easily generating a large number of requests to a KDC to receive session keys to nodes that are not interested in communication. Like Kerberos, TIGER requires two messages from the clients to establish session keys; however, in TIGER, each peer generates one message, as opposed to Kerberos, in which a single client generates both messages. TIGER therefore balances message load and energy consumption across the network more efficiently.

**L2-L1 Authentication and Key Establishment.** An L2 node wishing to view data collected by an L1 node must broadcast Hello messages in order to alert the L1 nodes of its presence. The L1 node A provides the L2 node with a token/MAC created in the same way as described above; the L2 node forwards the contents of this message on to the KDC. If the KDC is able to verify the MAC, the L2 node will have verified that it is indeed in contact with node A.

The KDC then returns a message to the L2 node containing a session key and a copy of the session key encrypted with the authenticator key of A. This information is included in a response to A, which also contains a MAC of the packet contents calculated with the KDC-generated session key. The last MAC can be confirmed as having been created by the L2 node after A has decrypted the session key. Because the L2 node cannot establish keys with the other remaining nodes in the network without their direct participation, least privilege is preserved. The messages to implement this protocol follow the flow shown in Fig. 6 and use the format below:

1. \[A \rightarrow L2 : A, L2, N, MAP_A, MAC(K_A^{AUTH}, L2|N)|MAP_A].\]
2. \[L2 \rightarrow KDC : \text{Forward Message 1 to KDC.}\]
3. \[KDC \rightarrow L2 : A, N, MAP_A\{K_{A,L2}, N, \{K_{A,L2}^{AUTH}\}_{(K_{KDC,L2})}\}.\]
4. \[L2 \rightarrow A : A, N, MAP_A\{K_{A,L2}, N\}_{(K_{KDC,L2})}, MAC(K_{A,L2}, A|N)|MAP_A\{K_{A,L2}, N\}_{(K_{KDC,L2})}.\]

**5 Performance Evaluation**

We now present the experimental results of the LIGER system implementation. In the first subsection, we present benchmark results for processing on individual nodes. In the next two sections, we present results on network initialization times obtained via simulation using TOSSIM [14].

**5.1 Node Benchmarks**

In this section, we discuss the implementation of the LION, TIGER, and LIGER components for our hybrid key management system. The Crossbow Mica2 mote [5], with a 4-MHz Atmel ATmega128L processor, 128 KB of program flash memory, 512 KB of measurement flash memory, and a 916-MHz ChipCon radio is used as the platform for L1 nodes. The L2 node consists of a Mica2 mote mated with a Crossbow Stargate with a 400-MHz Intel PXA255 Xscale processor, 64 MB of SDRAM, and 32 MB of flash memory. Additional tests were run using an L2 node with the Stargate replaced with a desktop computer with a 2.8-GHz Intel Pentium 4 processor and 512 MB of RAM running Fedora Core 2 with Linux Kernel 2.6. Where applicable, the KDC was executed on a desktop computer with the same configuration as described above.

A series of microbenchmarks were conducted in order to characterize the load placed upon each of the platforms. The average of these timing experiments, which were recorded over 10,000 iterations of the protocols (\(\sigma = \text{standard deviation}\)), are shown in Table 2.

The timing comparison between the two potential gateway platforms for TIGER illustrates the trade-offs between performance, portability, and expense. For example, the processing time of the L2 gateway function on the desktop is more than three times faster than the Stargate.
version. While a laptop computer could certainly be equipped with the same specifications as this desktop, placing such a device in an unattended setting may not be a realistic option. Furthermore, it may or may not be desirable to provide a user interface as part of the gateway device. The implications of particular platforms should therefore be carefully considered before deployment of each system.

A second observation of TIGER is that the processing associated with the secure link between the L2 node and the KDC accounts for approximately 70 percent of all processing on the Stargate gateways. An obvious improvement is to use a symmetric key between the KDC and GW. This reduction would allow the Stargate to process packets at a rate greater than their arrival, thereby making it equivalent to the desktop option. If the Stargate were the cheaper of the two platforms, the network could then be constructed for a reduced cost without negative consequences to performance.

From the results of the LION benchmarking, it is evident that the L1 nodes are a processing bottleneck. This further supports the unbalanced key distribution design of LION in which L2 nodes offload a great deal of processing from the L1 nodes.

Last, we consider the memory footprint of implementing a multimodal protocol. Table 3 offers a view of the code sizes. Through the careful reuse of similar functions, as shown in Fig. 7, the combination of both LION and TIGER protocols requires only slightly more storage space than independent implementations of each.

5.2 Network Initialization Results

5.2.1 Simulation Model

We focus on the initialization time using LION as it places the highest processing burden on the network and nodes.

Table 2: Microbenchmark Results for LION and TIGER Modes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>LION Mica2 (μsec)</th>
<th>LION Stargate (μsec)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RC5 Key Setup</td>
<td>5720.7 (σ=21.2)</td>
<td>24.7 (σ=1.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC Initialization</td>
<td>11060.0 (σ=6.6)</td>
<td>24.6 (σ=1.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC (54 byte Input)</td>
<td>15953.3 (σ=29.9)</td>
<td>42.6 (σ=1.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC5 Decryption</td>
<td>3312.5 (σ=12.6)</td>
<td>6.4 (σ=0.9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: L1 Code Size on Mica2 Motes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scheme</th>
<th>Size in ROM</th>
<th>Size in RAM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LION</td>
<td>19636</td>
<td>522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIGER</td>
<td>16148</td>
<td>458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIGER</td>
<td>20982</td>
<td>532</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Also, it is likely in many scenarios in which a network deployment is required in response to an emergency that the network may be deployed in an ad hoc fashion without initial access to a KDC. We specifically compare the performance of the balanced and unbalanced key distribution strategies.

As the TinyOS packet size is limited to 29 bytes of data and L1 nodes may contain between 10 and 328 keys, multiple packets must be broadcast to advertise all identifiers. Because a continuous sending of these packets fails in TOSSIM (and since spin locks do not exist in TOSSIM), we employed a daemon mechanism to handle sending packets from a node. A node maintains a list of packets to be transmitted. Whenever a packet to be sent is generated by the node, it is appended to this list. The packet at the head of this list is delivered to the medium every \( \alpha \) seconds. We set \( \alpha = 20 \text{ msec} \) in our simulations because this provides sufficient spacing for TOSSIM while still allowing for maximum channel utilization.

We predeploy a sufficient number of keys in each node to provide 0.99999 network connectivity as described in Section 3.3. A network is considered to be initialized when all nodes have established keys with at least 90 percent of their neighbors. In all scenarios tested, we fix the total
number of nodes to 100, each with a transmission range of 50 feet. In order to simplify simulations, all nodes in the network were assumed to have the same processing power. As real Stargate nodes will achieve much lower processing delays than the Mica2 motes, our results are very conservative.

We use “passive” key establishment to further improve performance. Suppose A broadcasts its key IDs. B replies to A, which gets an active key match with B. At the same time, B gets a passive key match with A since B knows which keys A has and then can find a match key. This will reduce the communication overhead and, hence, reduce the network initialization time. For the active key match, A challenges B, so it is sure about this key match. For the passive key match, B did not challenge A, so it is not sure about this key match since someone else can launch an attack by using A’s ID. As a result, this passive key match may not be a real match. However, this is not necessarily a problem since B can challenge A during its direct phase. Additionally, the “Request for Assistance” message could be encrypted in the key shared between the two parties and A is able to demonstrate its knowledge of the shared key with B. If we assume no compromise during network initialization, as is often done in this area [34], [36], passive matching is a good solution.

5.2.2 Parameter Setting
One immediate observation from the simulations is that, due to the nature of the key establishment protocols, many collisions occurred on the air interface during network initialization. To limit the number of collisions, nodes broadcast key requests with an initial random jitter. We chose the jitter value based on simple analysis and experimentation. Given the data rate of the wireless interface and the number of packets broadcast per node, with perfect scheduling, it requires approximately 40 seconds for all nodes to complete their broadcasts. We ran simulations for jitter times of 30-60 seconds. With a random jitter of 40 seconds or lower, we found that the number of collisions that occurred precluded nodes from reaching their expected level of key matching in each round, thus delaying network initialization. For values of greater than 50 seconds, we found little improvement in connectivity over the case of a 50 second jitter. Therefore, to keep the total delay of each phase low and to allow nodes to reach their ultimate connectivity quickly, we set the jitter to 50 seconds.

The necessity for this additional jitter highlights the need for more resilient MAC layer protocols [28], [35] in sensor networks. Because events, in this case, the establishment of keys, are likely to create a significant amount of traffic, it is critical that each layer is optimally designed to maximize the use of the spectrum. From the results of this work, it becomes obvious that a backoff algorithm that spaces retransmission attempts out more evenly would be extremely valuable.

5.2.3 Results: Initialization Time
In order to determine the amount of time required for the direct and indirect phases of LION, we set interphase timers to large values such that each stage becomes easily discernible. Fig. 8 demonstrates the separation of the direct and subsequent indirect phases on networks implementing the balanced and unbalanced keying schemes with five L2 gateway nodes deployed. Each point on the graph denotes a node completing the phase by achieving at least 90 percent connectivity (key matching) with its neighbors. The cumulative distribution function of the network initialization points is shown in Fig. 9.

As seen in Fig. 8, the balanced scheme requires eight phases (direct and seven indirect) for all nodes to achieve the target connectivity, while the unbalanced case requires three phases. The additional phases in the balanced case were required for two reasons. First, because nodes only have a 0.5 probability of having a key match directly with a neighbor in this case, multiple rounds of the indirect phase of the protocol are required for nodes to assist in establishing keys. Second, due to the large volume of traffic, many collisions occur despite the random jitter, further reducing the probability of successfully finding key matches in each round. In the unbalanced case, nodes have a high probability of having a key match with an L2 gateway, so fewer rounds are required.

Efficiently setting timers to achieve minimal interphase timeouts in real networks is challenging. Short timers increases the number of nodes competing for the medium and, therefore, adds the potential for more collisions and necessitates a potentially significant number of retransmissions. Setting timers too conservatively unnecessarily
increases the time required to bootstrap the network. In a manner reminiscent of setting the retransmission timers for TCP, we set the interphase timer to be the sum of the average stage termination time of each phase and a multiple of the standard deviation of the termination time. Based on the results of 1,000 simulations (see Table 4), we choose the average time plus 0.5σ as the timer value. Note that a more dynamic system, in which nodes transitioned between phases based on observed traffic, is also possible. Because such a system is more susceptible to a denial of service (DoS) attack, we leave the specification of robust online mechanisms to future work.

Table 5 demonstrates the average initialization times for grid networks containing zero, one, two, five, and 10 L2 nodes with internode spacing at five feet. The case of zero L2 nodes corresponds to a balanced key distribution. The relationship between initialization time and the number of L2 nodes is inversely proportional; however, the addition of L2 nodes to the network represents an increase in the cost of deployment. In order to balance robustness to failure with economics, the remainder of the experiments involving an unbalanced key distribution therefore assume the presence of five L2 nodes per neighborhood.

Fig. 10 shows the network initialization times for varying node densities for both the balanced and unbalanced (five L2 gateways) cases using both times based on perfect knowledge and via the method described in Table 4. As is evident, the unbalanced key distribution provides much lower network initialization times for dense sensor networks. The main reasons for this are the reduced number of rounds required when using the unbalanced key distribution as shown in Fig. 8 and a reduced number of packet collisions as discussed below.

While our network initialization time results are shown for cases in which 90 percent key matching with neighbors is required in a network, random graph theory [9] tells us that a node only needs to be directly connected to a small subset of its neighbors for a network to be fully connected. Moreover, a comparison of average path lengths for networks with at least 90 percent of neighbors having direct links to each node yields no statistically significant difference to the 100 percent case (T-Test: t = 0.876). Our experiments therefore strive to achieve 90 percent direct connectivity between nodes and their neighbors in order to minimize path lengths. Such initially high, direct connectivity may be unnecessary in many networks. For example, the administrator of a network may deem that having all nodes establish secure relationships with at least 60 percent of their neighbors is enough to meet some expectation of performance. Alternatively, a network could be deployed in an emergency situation and would therefore strive to gain the maximum secure connectivity possible within a given time limit.

### 5.2.4 Results: Message Complexity

Fig. 11 shows the number of messages that must be broadcast by the L1 nodes in order to achieve secure relationships with their neighbors. In the worst case, each L1 node in the balanced case is required to send two orders of magnitude more messages than in the unbalanced case. As transmission bandwidth is limited (38.4 Kbps theoretical maximum), the sheer number of packets needed to establish keys is overwhelmingly the source of delay in the system. This problem is not realistically solved by the introduction of higher bandwidth radios such as those included with the new MICAz [5]. Due to the power constraints inherent to wireless sensor devices, the number of packets that must be transmitted is far too expensive for real implementations.
The balanced key management approach is therefore inappropriate for most dense sensor networks.

Performance improvements in these networks, however, are not only limited to decreased packet volumes. The nature of the unbalanced key management system implemented in LION is such that certain nodes throughout the network, specifically L2s, are expected to process an elevated level of packets compared to their neighbors. Table 5 demonstrates decreased network quiescence time without a significant decrease in the number of messages transmitted by L1 nodes. This reduction is directly proportional to the number of L2 nodes sharing the processing load. The addition of L2 nodes to real sensor networks would therefore have performance benefits additional to those recorded via TOSSIM.

6 DISCUSSION
6.1 Node Compromise
Recall that all communicating nodes establish a new key per session, even if they have a direct key match. Further, all nodes that assist in establishing session keys during the indirect key matching phase delete the session keys they assign once key initialization is complete; in addition, the communicating end points re-key immediately. Therefore, compromised nodes cannot eavesdrop on any ongoing communication other than that which is directly terminated on the compromised node. The greater danger is that these compromised nodes may establish new session keys to inject false data into the network or assist in establishing new session keys for neighbors and be able to eavesdrop on new sessions. We begin by analyzing the ability of compromised L1 nodes to communicate with their neighbors. The results are summarized in Fig. 12.

Superficially, it would appear as if an attacker need only compromise a small number of L1 nodes in order to detrimentally affect the network. The modifications to the network model, however, offer additional protections to the network. Intrusion detection schemes successful in ad hoc networks [19] can now be applied to protect sensor networks. Additional help can potentially be offered by infrastructure-based resources now available through the backhaul link.

Even in the absence of compromise detection, authentication via the $q$-composite scheme protects network integrity from a large number of compromised nodes. As is shown in Fig. 13, nodes with an unbalanced distribution of keys can probabilistically authenticate each other in the absence of a KDC with much higher probability than nodes with balanced distributions. Attempting to forge identity or eavesdrop by compromising specific keys is also difficult. For example, in a network of 1,000 nodes (12.5 percent being L2s), each key is likely to be located in approximately 1 percent of the nodes on average. An attacker selecting nodes randomly would therefore have to physically compromise almost 100 nodes (12.5 percent being L2s) in order to locate a specific key. Searching for $q$ specific keys in order to impersonate a particular identity is therefore extremely costly to an adversary. Moreover, if an attacker is able to compromise nearly 100 nodes in a network without being detected, the system is likely facing far more critical problems. The drastic reduction in the cost of the $q$-composite scheme due to network heterogeneity therefore further bolsters the strength of this probabilistic keying method.

The compromise of an L2 node is, of course, potentially profoundly damaging to the system. These nodes are responsible for the majority of keying material and potential connectivity with other areas of the network. The presence of such nodes, however, presents more opportunities for the advancement of security in this setting than are obvious at first glance. For example, under the homogeneous model, the goals of tamper resistance and cost minimization are in direct competition. Under the heterogeneous model, only a small portion of the nodes in the network would require such protection. The total cost of effectively providing tamper resistance to the network is therefore greatly reduced. In concert with all of the previously mentioned benefits, the overall security of a system built on the principle of heterogeneity is significantly greater than its homogeneous counterpart.

6.2 Switching Modes of Operation
The advantage of LIGER is that it allows a sensor network to operate in a secure and efficient manner regardless of the available resources. There are, however, a number of tradeoffs experienced by a system operating in either mode. A comparison of these issues is made below so as to further clarify the effectiveness of the mechanisms provided by
both LION and TIGER. Specifically, we examine the effects of transitioning between modes and discuss how security is affected.

**TIGER to LION.** An example system likely to initialize using TIGER and transition into the LION protocol is a sensor network that is deployed in support of a planned operation. In this case, session keys may be initialized in a controlled environment with access to a KDC. As the operation progresses, it is possible that access to the KDC is lost.

In the ideal setting, a sensor network is allowed to initialize in the presence of a KDC. Every node in the network is able to authenticate each of its neighbors to the full extent supported by this system. Because the KDC knows all of the keys stored in both the L1 and L2 nodes, it can send the key identifiers common to an L1/L2 pair to an L2 node in message 4 of the TIGER protocol flow. If the system later transitions in to the LION protocol, either by design or out of necessity, the stored, authenticated key identifiers now in the L2 node can be used for performing authentication of L1 nodes when refreshing expired keys or helping to establish an authenticated connection between two L1s without the presence of a KDC. The limitations and benefits of this approach are discussed in detail below.

As shown in Fig. 13, if 750 keys are deployed in an L2 node and 30 keys are deployed in an L1 node, the probability of the L2 having two matching keys with a particular L1 node is 67 percent; the probability of three keys matching is 39 percent. While these values show that, in many cases, an L2 node will not be able to authenticate an L1 node by challenging with multiple keys, they are still high enough that, if a node does have two or three key matches with the L2 node, the L2 node can be highly confident that the node is not being impersonated. With these key deployments, the probability of two L1 nodes having the same two or three key matches with a L2 node is 8.70 \cdot 10^{-6} and 2.44 \cdot 10^{-8}, respectively.

If, on the other hand, the L2 node is deployed with a much larger number of keys, the number of keys it has in common with L1 nodes may be much higher. In this case, the L2 node may decide to cease using the KDC by design. The benefit of this approach would be that the authentication would be performed locally and the network delay incurred by accessing a KDC would be removed.

A benefit of using the initial KDC connectivity to inform L2 nodes of the keys deployed in L1 nodes is that L1 nodes will no longer be required to broadcast their key IDs in stand-alone operation to establish session keys with L2 nodes. From a security perspective, this reduces information leakage from the system. The details of this leakage are discussed in reverse transition below.

**LION to TIGER.** A network operating in the military scenario suggested in the introduction would likely begin secure operation via the LION protocol. Because of the lack of friendly troops with connections to a backbone network and the need for a rapid deployment, initial access to a KDC may not be possible.

The difficulty with the LION scheme, while providing security in the absence of a KDC, is that its ability to truly authenticate nodes is more limited. However, some level of authentication is possible if we assume, like a number of other schemes [36], that the initial broadcast of key identifiers is conducted during a network bootstrapping phase wherein all nodes are free from compromise. During this bootstrapping phase, nodes can create a list of key identifiers present in each node. After that period, authentication of new connections can be achieved via the comparison of keys known to be shared with a neighbor versus those used to sign or encrypt a message. As would be expected, the likelihood that two L1 nodes have a large number of key matches to create relatively strong authenticator keys is unlikely. However, if unbalanced key distribution is used, L2 nodes will have a reasonable probability of having multiple key matches with L1 nodes.

The main drawbacks of this scheme are the reliance on the assumption that nodes are not compromised during the start-up period and that the key identifiers must be broadcast. As mentioned earlier, broadcasting key identifiers does not explicitly reveal any information about the value of keys that cannot be gained from a traffic analysis attack [9]; however, information is still being leaked to an adversary through this approach. If an attacker is able to compromise a large number of nodes, it becomes possible to use the key identifiers to pick a node to impersonate.

Schemes where key identifiers are assigned via a hash function [37] exacerbate this problem further by allowing an attacker to determine which nodes they can impersonate without ever having been near that target. While many have argued against the use of a broadcast mechanism for the distribution of key identifiers, it forces an adversary to have physical proximity to a node it intends to impersonate, thereby making the system more robust.

Because it is easier to impersonate another node while a network is running in LION mode, an administrator may consider forcing all nodes in the network to reestablish keys if a KDC becomes available. Assuming that all $k$ keys within an L1 node were not known to the adversary, the system prevents malicious nodes added by the attacker from injecting further data into the network. This purging of the system, of course, comes at the cost of the additional overhead associated with reinitializing an entire network. It is possible, however, for only select portions of the network to engage in mode transition. For example, highly physically trafficked areas of a network may choose to perform such re-keying, whereas more physically secure locations could remain in LION mode.

In summary, it is always advantageous to initialize a network using TIGER. In this mode, nodes may be authenticated with a confidence level as an attacker was required to guess a 128-bit key. Also, information may be securely distributed to L2 nodes so that some level of authentication may be performed if the KDC becomes unavailable. If the network must initialize using LION, some level of authentication may still be performed, but some information may be leaked to adversaries.

### 7 Conclusion

In this paper, we have leveraged the emerging trend of heterogeneity in sensor networks to provide new, more efficient mechanisms for secure communications. We began by introducing the probabilistic unbalanced key distribution. In this scheme, nodes with more intrinsic resources are responsible for a greater proportion of the communications supported by this system. Because the KDC knows all of the keys stored in both the L1 and L2 nodes, it can send the key identifiers common to an L1/L2 pair to an L2 node in message 4 of the TIGER protocol flow.
and memory overhead associated with security. Second, we proposed a number of trust models for key establishment. The combination of these two techniques allows for the administrator of a system to implement policy at a much finer granularity and lower cost than in previous systems. Third, we designed a multimodal key establishment protocol. Whether in the presence or absence of a backhaul link, nodes running the LIGER suite are able to take advantage of all available security resources in potentially dynamic environments. Fourth, we performed extensive evaluations of both code requirements and performance. These experiments not only demonstrated an improvement of up to two orders of magnitude for transmission counts and network initialization time, but also illustrated the minimal increase of code size necessary to provide multimodal functionality. Finally, we demonstrate the robustness of node compromise provided by the combination of the unbalanced keying scheme and LIGER. In so doing, we have designed, implemented, and fully characterized a novel new security architecture for emerging sensor networks.

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REFERENCES
Patrick Traynor received the BS degree in computer science from the University of Richmond in 2002 and the MS degree in computer science and engineering from the Pennsylvania State University in 2004. He is a PhD candidate in the Department of Computer Science and Engineering at the Pennsylvania State University, where he is the lead graduate student for the Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory. His research efforts are focused primarily on the security of interconnected IP and telecommunications networks. He is a student member of the IEEE.

Raju Kumar received the Btech degree in computer science and engineering from the Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur in 2003. He is a PhD candidate in the Department of Computer Science and Engineering at the Pennsylvania State University and is a member of the Networking and Security Research Center. His research interests are in the areas of ad hoc, sensor, and mesh networks.

Heesook Choi received the BS degree in computer science and statistics and the MS degree in computer science from the Chungnam National University, Korea, in 1990 and 1992, respectively. She is a PhD candidate in the Department of Computer Science and Engineering at Pennsylvania State University. She was a senior research staff in the Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI) in Korea before she enrolled in the PhD program at State University in August 2002. Her research focuses on security in mobile wireless networks. She is a student member of the IEEE.

Guohong Cao received the BS degree from Xian Jiaotong University, Xian, China. He received the MS degree and PhD degree in computer science from the Ohio State University in 1997 and 1999, respectively. Since then, he has been with the Department of Computer Science and Engineering at the Pennsylvania State University, where he is currently an associate professor. His research interests are wireless networks and mobile computing. He has published more than 100 papers in the areas of sensor networks, wireless network security, data dissemination, resource management, and distributed fault-tolerant computing. He is an editor of the IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing and IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, a coguest editor of special issue on heterogeneous wireless networks in ACM/Kluwer Mobile Networking and Applications, and has served on the program committee of many conferences. He was a recipient of the US National Science Foundation CAREER award in 2001. He is a senior member of the IEEE and the IEEE Computer Society.

Sencun Zhu received the PhD degree in information technology from George Mason University in 2004. He is an assistant professor in Department of Computer Science and Engineering and the College of Information Sciences and Technology at Pennsylvania State University. His research interests include sensor and ad hoc network security, worm and buffer overflow detection, and DDOS attack traceback.

Thomas La Porta received the BSEE and MSEE degrees from The Cooper Union, New York, New York, and the PhD degree in electrical engineering from Columbia University, New York, New York. He joined the Computer Science and Engineering Department at Penn State in 2002 as a full professor. He is the director of the Networking and Security Research Center at Penn State. Prior to joining Penn State, Dr. La Porta was with Bell Laboratories since 1986. He was the director of the Mobile Networking Research Department in Bell Laboratories, Lucent Technologies, where he led various projects in wireless and mobile networking. He is a Bell Labs Fellow, a fellow of the IEEE, and a member of the IEEE Computer Society. Dr. La Porta was the founding editor-in-chief of the IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing and served as editor-in-chief of IEEE Personal Communications Magazine. He is currently the Director of Magazines for the IEEE Communications Society and is a member of the Communications Society Board of Governors. He has published more than 50 technical papers and holds 28 patents. His research interests include mobility management, signaling and control for wireless networks, mobile data systems, and protocol design.

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